Buffalo Law Review
Volume 54

Number 5

Article 7

4-1-2007

Bridging the "Philosophical Void" in Punitive Damages:
Empowering Plaintiffs and Society through Curative Damages
Leah R. Mervine
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Leah R. Mervine, Bridging the "Philosophical Void" in Punitive Damages: Empowering Plaintiffs and
Society through Curative Damages, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 1587 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol54/iss5/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Bridging the "Philosophical Void" In Punitive
Damages: Empowering Plaintiffs and Society
Through Curative Damages
LEAH R. MERVINEt
INTRODUCTION

On Saturday, March 25, 1995, at 3:35 p.m., eighteenyear-old driver Jason Moore approached the peak of a steep
hill in Stark County, Ohio transporting five of his friends
from Northwest High School.' Little did they know that on
a routine drive, their lives would be shattered. A blink-ofthe-eye later, all of the car's backseat passengers were
dead. Like the many accidents that occurred at this exact
spot, Moore's car collided with a Conrail freight train. This

t Managing Editor, Buffalo Law Review, 2006-2007; J.D. Candidate, Class of
2007, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School; M.S.W. State
University of New York at Buffalo; B.A. The University of Vermont. Without
the guidance and encouragement of Giuseppe A. Ippolito, this Comment would
not have been possible. I am also grateful to my moot court partner Geoffrey A.
Kaeuper, for his unwavering support throughout this writing process and law
school. Additionally, I owe much gratitude to the Moore family for sharing their
story, attorney Tom Murray for his time, Professor Laura Reilly for her editing
assistance, and to the associates and editors of the Buffalo Law Review who
worked on this Comment. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Barbara I.
Mervine and Lawrence E. Mervine, and to my grandparents, Otto Hahn, and
the late Pearl Nevins Hahn, not only for teaching me the value of tzedakah,
tikkun olam, and social justice through their words, but for instilling these
virtues in me through their actions, and to Nathaniel Carpenter Merritt for
reminding me of their lessons daily.
1. See James F. McCarty, Turning Tragic Loss Into Help for Others, PLAIN
DEALER, Feb. 28, 1998, at 1A; Dave Sereno, Railroad Guardians, REPOSITORY,
Feb. 24, 1998, at 1A. The teenagers decided to take a Saturday afternoon drive
to see a piece of land that Jason Moore's parents were contemplating
purchasing. See Affidavit of Jason B. Moore at 3, Moore v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
1995-CV-01196 (Stark County Ct. of Com. P1. filed July 18, 1995).
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train-car collision was the eighth accident and eighth
fatality to occur at the Deerfield crossing since 1975.2
The driver's parents, Vicky and Dennis 3 Moore, were
devastated. Jason Moore, along with Jennifer Helms and
Rebecca White, were seriously injured; seventeen-year-old4
Joshua White and sixteen-year-old Alyson Ley were dead.
But the most devastating blow to the Moores came when
they learned that their youngest child, sixteen-year-old
Ryan Moore, was also killed. 5 To add insult to injury, the
Moores discovered that the accident could have easily been
avoided if the crossing had been properly marked. 6 Instead
of flashing lights and a gate, all that marked the Deerfield
Avenue crossing was a simple crossbuck sign. 7 When the

2. McCarty, supranote 1, at 1A. The first accident occurred on July 12, 1975
when a southbound car was struck by a Conrail train. The driver, Theodore
Mika, along with his wife Marion, and passenger Judith Hammock were killed.
Only one passenger in the car, Judith Hammock's husband Lee, survived. See
Affidavit of Lee Hammock at 1, Moore v. Consol. Rail Corp., 1995-CV-01196
Stark County Ct. of Com. P1. filed July 18, 1995). According to Vicky Moore,
gates were finally installed in November of 1995 at the Deerfield crossing, eight
months after their son and his friends were killed. Interview with Vicky L.
Moore, Trustee, The Angels on Track Foundation/Crossing To Safety, in
Salineville, Ohio (July 31, 2006) [hereinafter Vicky Moore Interview].
3. Also known as "Denny." See Molly McDonough, Handing Down Help,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 2005, at 24, 24.
4. See Chris Sewell, Angels on Track: The Legacy of Ryan Moore, ON THE
2004, http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/
Apr. 16,
000011.php, availableat http://www.angelsontrack.orglegacy.htm.
5. See id.

DOCKET,

6. Despite the fact that Jason slowed the car to around ten miles per hour
and looked both ways, he only saw the train as it began to collide with his car.
See Order at 9, Moore v. Consol. Rail Corp., 1995-CV-01196 (Stark County Ct.
of Com. P1. filed July 18, 1995). Moreover,
Conrail knew that Deerfield [Road] had a 55 miles per hour speed limit
and that 25 trains a day traveled at speeds up to 60 miles over this
crossing. Conrail knew that no stop sign was present on Deerfield Road
at the crossing. Conrail knew that foliage significantly obstructed the
view of cars on Deerfield Road. With the accident history, with the road
and track speed, with the hill contour, with the foliage, Conrail knew
harm accompanied its failure to safeguard this crossing.
Id. at 10.
7. A crossbuck sign is "a white, X-shaped sign with the words 'RAILROAD
CROSSING' written in black." Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, Railroad Crossings (Sept.
4, 2002) (unpublished column on file with the Supreme Court of Ohio Office of
Public Information). On June 23, 1993, a "Buckeye crossbuck" was installed at
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Moores learned of the hazard the crossing presented, they
mustered their strength and decided to fight back. But as
they considered a civil suit against Conrail, they faced the
disconnect created by America's civil litigation systemhow do you derive satisfaction from the legal fiction that
money can replace lives? The Moores, determined to make
Conrail accountable for its actions, went through the
motions of a civil trial, if for nothing else but to punish
Conrail for its inaction and achieve some semblance of
justice for their son. They had no intention to use the legal
system to swap their son's life for a check.8 Represented by
several attorneys, including Tom Murray, 9 the Moores sued
Conrail for wrongful death. 0
During the litigation of the Moore case something
"magical" happened." After the jury assessed compensatory
damages against Conrail, the jury affirmed that punitive
damages were warranted. 12 Before assessing punitive
the Deerfield Road crossing. A "Buckeye crossbuck" is also a passive marker,
but offers additional features including red and white reflective material and a
red panel on the lower half featuring the word "YIELD." See Affidavit of F.X.
Giacoma at 1, Moore v. Consol. Rail Corp., 1995-CV-01196 (Stark County Ct. of
Com. P1. filed July 18, 1995).
8. Before going to trial, the Moores spoke with their attorneys about their
desire to earmark any award toward protecting the public from dangerous,
unmarked crossings like the one that killed their son. "Denny and I had always
known what we wanted to do; we just didn't know how to go about it." Vicky
Moore Interview, supranote 2.
9. Thomas (Tom) J. Murray, Jr. is a senior partner at Murray & Murray Co.,
L.P.A. in Sandusky, Ohio. Mr. Murray has coined the concept of "curative
damages."
10. See Moore v. Consol. Rail Corp., 1995-CV-01196 (Stark County Ct. of
Com. P1. filed July 18, 1995).
11. Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Murray, Jr., Senior Partner,
Murray & Murray, Co., LPA, in Sandusky, Ohio (Jan. 25, 2006) [hereinafter
Tom Murray Interview].
12. In the Moore case, liability was assessed separately from the punitive
damages in what is known as a bifurcated trial. See id. Ohio Civil Rule 42(B)
provides:
The court, after a hearing, in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, or
third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right
to trial by jury.
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damages the jury recognized the Moore's dilemma-money
could never replace their son. Disturbed by the hazardous
conditions that existed at the crossings like the one that
killed Ryan Moore, Joshua White, and Alyson Ley, the jury
wanted Conrail to be held accountable in a meaningful way.
In a special note sent to the trial judge, the jury questioned
whether they were permitted to ask the plaintiffs to use a
portion of the punitive damages to install safety lights and
gates at similar crossings. In an unprecedented move,
Judge James S. Gwin allowed the question. 13 The Moores,
who sued seeking justice not "blood money,"'14 eagerly
agreed to sign a binding stipulation to assign one hundred
percent of their punitive damages award toward improving
the safety of Ohio's railroad crossings. 15
In another unprecedented move, Judge Gwin also
informed the jury that the Moores agreed to use their
portion of the punitive damages toward improving the
safety of crossings like the one that killed their son. When
the trial ended on June 28, 1997, the Moores were awarded
$7 million in punitive damages.16 Like soon-to-be-parents,
the Moores spent the next year preparing for the arrival of
the award. They worked with attorneys from Akron, Ohio to
set up a charitable foundation, naming it "The Angels on
Track Foundation."'1 7 In February 1998, after the Ohio
Supreme Court approved the award, and attorney's fees
and costs were deducted, $5.4 million provided the seed

OHIO ADMIN. CODE 42 (2007). See, e.g., Giuseppe A. Ippolito, Comment, Does

Plaintiff Exclusion Have a Role to Play in Twenty-First Century Negligence
Litigation?, 23 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 89, 104-07 (2004) (generally discussing trial
bifurcation).
13. Tom Murray Interview, supra note 11.
14. McDonough, supra note 3, at 24. Washington Post journalist Laura
Blumenfeld casually describes "blood money" as "when someone gives you lots
of nice things so you don't get revenge on them." LAURA BLUMENFELD, REVENGE:
A STORY OF HOPE 94 (2002).
15. See Tom Murray Interview, supra note 11; see also Vicky Moore
Interview, supranote 2.
16. The White family, who also lost their son, received $1 million in punitive
damages, which they donated to the YMCA of Stark County. The family of
Alyson Ley settled out of court with Conrail. See McCarty, supra note 1, at 1A.
17. For more information about the foundation, see Angels On Track,
http://www.angelsontrack.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
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money for the new foundation.' 8 At the time, Vicky Moore
declared, "[w]e wan[t] to correct the problem, and we're
going to spend the rest of our lives trying to do it."'19
The Moores have remained true to their word. With the
mantra "Bad Crossings Kill Good Drivers," 20 the Moores
have taken railroads to task, testifying at the highest levels
of government, 21 all while disbursing grants to help
communities afford flashing lights and gates. The autonomy
provided by punitive damages funding has allowed Angels
on Track to become a vocal advocate for a critical issue that
is often swept under the rug by the powerful railroad
interests. 22 But, most importantly, this new type of justice,
coined "curative damages," has given both the Moore family
and society something the traditional civil system could
not-a cure.
Curative damages have tremendous potential to
improve the American civil litigation system. Like any
promising doctrine, curative damages are garnering both
praise and controversy. 23 The concept involves simply
allowing the plaintiff to stipulate in court that the punitive
award will be put toward societal good. While this
stipulation may appear simplistic, the concept is sweeping
punitive damages into a new era. Rather than a purely
mechanistic system of monetary compensation for losses
and punishment, curative damages respond to the
plaintiffs need for fulfillment. Curative damages denounce
the harm to the world and restore the plaintiffs sense of
justice. They do not make the plaintiff complete, but
curative damages can prevent the same catastrophe from

18. McCarty, supranote 1, at IA.
19. Id.
20. Angels On Track, http://www.angelsontrack.org (last visited Mar. 22,
2007).
21. See Grade Crossing: Hearing on Railroad Grade Crossing Safety Issues,
Before the Subcomm. on R.R., of the Transp. & Infrastructure Comm., 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Vicky Moore, Trustee, Angels on Track) (on file with
Buffalo Law Review).
22. According to Vicky Moore, her attempt to join the board of Operation
Lifesaver, a national, non-profit railroad safety group whose board is comprised
of railroad lobbyists and railroad personnel, was denied. See id.
23. See generally McDonough, supra note 3.
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ripping apart the fabric of someone else's life. Curative
damages have the ability to do just that-cure.
While the concept of curative damages is simple, the
history behind the doctrine from which curative damages
extends is dense and controversial. This Comment
demonstrates the potential of curative damages and offers
solutions to minimize the controversy surrounding this new
doctrine. Part I of this Comment provides an overview of
the concept of curative damages and how to implement
curative damages into the framework of our civil litigation
jurisprudence. In order to learn more about how curative
damages fit into the civil litigation framework, Part II
provides a look at the divisive history of punitive damages.
Part III reviews modifications to punitive damages
including split recovery. Part IV defends the doctrine of
punitive damages. Finally, in Part V, this Comment will
provide a framework for integrating curative damages into
our civil justice system.
I. OVERVIEW OF CURATIVE DAMAGES
The idea behind curative damages is simple. "The idea
is that damages awards are used to 'cure' a problem rather
'24
than provide punitive relief in the traditional sense.
Thus, "[i]t is an idea that promotes more constructive
interaction between negligent defendants and harmed
individuals. '25 Much like a class action settlement, where a
corporation may give money to a charity of the plaintiffs
damages expand
choice to ameliorate a harm,26 curative
27
this arrangement into the courtroom.

24. McDonough, supra note 3, at 24.
25. Id.
26. For about a decade, a number of states have routinely used the doctrine
of cy pres, which was traditionally used to distribute a trust fund when the
original purpose could not longer be met, in the class action arena. See NY
STATE BAR

Assoc.,

MANUAL ON CY PRES FOR LEGAL SERVICES

(2007). For

example, New York's Attorney General sued a popular women's shoe company,
Nine West, for price fixing. After "the court concluded it would have been
extremely difficult to identify a meaningful number of individual shoe
purchasers who were economically injured by Nine West's conspiracy," the court
approved a cy pres settlement and allowed the Attorney General to use the
funds to assist women's charities. Press Release, Office of the New York State
Attorney General, Domestic Violence, Breast Cancer Awareness Groups Among
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Two main principles guide curative damages: first, that
the plaintiff has a choice, and second, that instead of
receiving a meaningless windfall, the plaintiff has the
power to provide a curative effect. 28 The doctrine's founder,
Tom Murray, explained, "'[i]t occurred to me, years ago,
that this idea of punishing a defendant in a civil case could
be improved upon by addressing what has historically been
the most persuasive argument against punitive damages,
namely that it represents a windfall for the plaintiff who
has already been compensated.' 29 While curative damages
litigation, 30
were created in the context of wrongful death
31
the concept is expandable to other civil harms.
The process is simple-with the jury's knowledge,
plaintiffs make binding stipulations that they will turn a
portion or the entirety of the punitive damages over to a
specific charity. Informing a jury that the punitive damages
are earmarked toward societal good need not be prejudicial
to the defendant. Despite heavy criticism from the defense
bar and judiciary, 32 if the trial has been bifurcated and fault
has been previously assigned, this information is not
prejudicial to the defendant and prevents the jury from
providing an inadequate award. 33 Not only does informing
the jury insure an adequate reward, it shifts power back to
plaintiffs by allowing them to publicly disavow the notion
that they are "trying to make a profit off a loved one's
death,"34 or trying to make a profit off of a misfortune that
befell them. It is not enough for a plaintiff to make the
donation after the trial is complete; the power in curative
damages comes from the court's involvement with the
beneficiary charity.
Recipients of Anti-Trust

Settlement Funds (Oct. 26, 2001), available at

http://www.oag.state. ny.us/press/2001/oct/oct26a_01.html.
27. See McDonough, supra note 3, at 24.
28. See Tom Murray Interview, supranote 11.
29. McDonough, supra note 3, at 25 (quoting Tom Murray).
30. See Tom Murray Interview, supranote 11.
31. See id.
32. See id.; McDonough, supra note 3, at 25.
33. See infra Part V.
34. Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, Of Pearls and Silver Linings (Mar. 11, 1998)
(unpublished column on file with the Supreme Court of Ohio Office of Public
Information).
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The Moore case planted the seed of possibility that
curative damages can become a critical component in civil
cases. Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul E. Pfeifer praised
the case's outcome, noting that the Moores, "endured
catastrophe and turned their suffering into a victory of the
soul."3 5 However, the Moore case is not the first time that
Tom Murray attempted to make damages curative. Before
the Moore case, Tom Murray litigated a similar case against
the same defendant. That case involved sixteen-year-old
driver Michelle Wightman and her friend Karrie Wieber,
who were killed when Michelle followed a heavy stream of
motorists crossing a railroad track where the gates had
been activated for an extended period of time due to a
disabled train. 36 As their car crossed the track, both girls
were killed
instantly by a train passing on the opposite
7
tracks.3
The Wightman case has become the pioneering case for
the concept of curative damages. Due to a procedural ruling
that came down from the Supreme Court of Ohio, a
significant break occurred between the liability phase and
the penalty phase of that trial. In the time in between, Tom
Murray counseled his client Darlene Wightman, 3s who sued
Conrail on behalf of her daughter's estate for wrongful
death 39 and on her own behalf for the loss of her

35. Id. at 34. Interestingly, despite his public praise for the Moore case,
noting in the same article that "the [Moore] jury was presented with the
information that money from punitive damages would go into a charitable
trust," id., Justice Pfiefer has also been quoted as saying, "juries should not be
made aware that part of the punitive damages would be diverted into a special
fund." Lee Leonard, Ruling Highlights Court's Split: Punitive Damages Given to
New Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 3, 2003, at 1C.
36. See Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999). The
employees of the disabled train were aware that there were other active trains
in the area and the visibility of their parked train created a dangerous situation
as traffic began to flow across the crossing, yet they chose not to post a flagman.
Police became aware of the situation, but left the scene for another call after
Conrail was advised to post a flagman. One train passed the crossing at seventy
miles per hour without incident. The next train to pass, which was traveling
almost sixty miles per hour, broadsided the Wightman vehicle. Id. at 549.
37. Id.
38. Darlene Wightman has since divorced and changed her name to Darlene
Lowery. See McDonough, supra note 3, at 24.
39. Like many other states, Ohio does not allow punitive damages in cases
where the sole claim is for wrongful death. See Wightman, 715 N.E.2d at 559
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automobile. 40 Acting on Mr. Murray's suggestion that
something positive could come from the loss of the girls,
Mrs. Wightman formed the Michelle Wightman Charitable
Foundation. 41 While the jury was unaware of the existence
of the Foundation, the Foundation was permitted to become
a party of interest in the case. 42 In 1999, in a decision
written by Justice Pfiefer, the Supreme Court of Ohio
of $15 million, all of which went
upheld the punitive award
43
to fund the Foundation.
Just as the concept of curative damages has received
national attention and praise, Tom Murray, the pioneer of
this concept, has been commended by colleagues. Notre
Dame Law School Dean Emeritus David Link 44 is an
advocate of the concept. He applauded Tom Murray's
model, noting that "'[i]t's not enough to win cases for
clients. [Tom Murray] wants to make sure this doesn't

(Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Under Ohio law, punitive
damages are not permitted in wrongful death cases."); see also McBride v. Gen.
Motors Co., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1576 (M.D. Ga. 1990) ("Punitive damages are
not permitted in wrongful death actions in Georgia, for this would permit a
double recovery to the plaintiff."); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1981) ("[T]o grant the heirs an additional, separate
and independent right to recover punitive damages in a wrongful death action
would permit double punishment for the same tortious conduct and could also
lead to double recovery of punitive damages by the heirs."). The widespread use
of curative damages may open the door for punitive damages in wrongful death
cases where no property loss has occurred. The court in Wightman alludes to
this issue, noting that "[aln expensive car does not make the [punitive] award
more legitimate." Wightman, 715 N.E.2d at 554.
40. The claim for the loss of the automobile allowed for punitive damages in
this case. Wightman, 715 N.E.2d at 552-53.
41. The name of the foundation has been changed to the 'Wightman-Wieber
Foundation." The foundation is focused on granting funds to various Ohio
organizations. Mrs. Lowery, Michelle's mother said, '"[b]y having a foundation
and knowing that if [Michelle] were still alive, she would be doing so much for
other people, it kind of makes you feel like you've got part of her here."'
McDonough, supra note 3, at 25 (quoting Darlene (Wightman) Lowery).
42. See Tom Murray Interview, supra note 11.
43. See Wightman, 715 N.E.2d at 557. The jury had originally awarded
Michelle Wightman's mother $25 million, however the Court granted Conrail's
request for remittitur and reduced the award by $10 million. Id. at 550.
44. David T. Link is the Joseph A. Matson Dean Emeritus and Professor of
Law at Notre Dame Law School. He is also President of the International
Centre for Healing and the Law and a board member of Tom Murray's Future of
Russia Foundation.
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happen 45to someone else ..
he gives lawyers a great
name."'
Currently, Murray is working with Dr. Camille
Wortman 46 to garner empirical data on the effects of
curative damages. 47 Thus far, Dr. Wortman's research
shows that the parents Murray has worked with have
"shown miraculous evidence of getting over their grief
because their energy is focused on others." 48 In addition to
working with Dr. Wortman, Murray has also enlisted the
support of Dean Link to promote the concept of curative
damages. Murray notes that curative damages return
the
49
law to what it is intended to be: a "healing profession."

II. HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In order to understand the positive direction in which
curative damages are leading America's civil litigation
system, it is helpful to understand what the doctrine of
punitive damages is missing. Like the outgrowth of curative
damages, punitive damages are not without their own set of
controversy. While many solutions have been proposed to
redefine and reform punitive damages, they fall flat in the
face of curative damages.
Throughout their history, punitive damages have also
been known as exemplary damages, vindictive damages,
smart money, punitory damages, and a host of other
names. 50 Just as the name for this type of damages varies,

45. Michael K. McIntyre, To Russia, With Love, PLAIN DEALER SUN. MAG.,
Dec. 21, 2003, at 7 (quoting Dean Link).
46. Camille Wortman, Ph.D. is a professor of psychology at State University
of New York at Stony Brook. Her work focuses on grief and loss issues.
47. See Tom Murray Interview, supra note 11; see also Professional Profile,
Camille Wortman, Ph.D., http://wortman.socialpsychology.org (last visited Jan.
25, 2007).
48. Tom Murray Interview, supranote 11.
49. Id.

50. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 41 (1983) ("[Plunitive damages [are]
also called exemplary damages, vindictive damages, or smart money."); Murphy
v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 122 (Colo. 1884) ("The words 'smart money' and also the
following adjectives have been used to designate this class of damages:
'speculative,' 'imaginary,' 'presumptive,' 'exemplary,' 'vindictive,' and 'punitive'
or 'punitory."'); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 343 (1872) ("[W]e must regard the
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so do the reasons for it. In order to get a sense of how
curative damages fit into our modern day context, it is
helpful to review the extensive history of punitive damages.
The purpose of civil litigation is "the redress of wrongs
by compelling compensation or restitution: the wrongdoer is
not punished, he only suffers so much harm as is necessary
to make good the wrong he has done. '51 Thus, a plaintiff
can obtain compensatory damages which cover the amount
of a plaintiffs damaged property and in some cases
intangible damages such as "pain and suffering. '52 Unlike
compensatory damages, punitive damages are awarded
against the defendant to punish and deter them, not as
additional compensation for the plaintiff.
Because punitive damages are an outgrowth of common
law, 53 states vary on the conduct necessary to award
punitive awards. As a general rule, at a minimum, some
type of reckless disregard for the plaintiff is needed before
punitive damages can be imposed. 54 In a sense, this makes
punitive damages a "quasi-criminal" remedy as punitive
damages are a punishment for the defendant. 55 The true
intent of punitive damages is an area of intense debate. 56
While punitive damages punish egregious actions, they stop
short of ameliorating the wrong done to the plaintiff.
The concept of giving the plaintiff more compensation
than the value of the loss dates back to ancient times.
Hammurabi's Code demands that "the tamkarum who
terms exemplary, vindictive, and punitive or punitory, as meaning the same
thing.").
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (7th ed. 1999) (quoting William Geldart,
Introduction to English Law, 146 (D.C.M. Yardley ed., 9th ed. 1984)).
52. See, e.g., Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The
IrrationalCenterpiece of our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401 (2004).
53. See, e.g., Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d
77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145.
54. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 39-41.
55. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424,
432 (2001).
56. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25 (1991); Michael B.
Kelly, Do Punitive Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429,
1429-30 (2004); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages:
Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 132-33
(2002); E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 839 (1993).
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falsely denies the receipt of money from his agent must pay
sixfold and the samallum in the converse case pays
threefold the amount of the sum denied." 57 This payment of
money above compensation resembles punitive damages in
our modern law. 58 Another important distinction that these
primitive punitive damages carry is the fact that unlike the
criminal fines of today, "[n]one of these payments . . .goes
[sic] to the state," 59 instead, they are "payable to the injured
party."60 Thus, the Babylonians recognized the individual's
need to be vindicated by way of additional compensation. It
has been noted that these "payments must be distinguished
from fines, which are penalties paid to the state because in
theory the community has been injured .
*."..,61
This
valuation of the victim gives historical precedent to the
notion that victims are
deserving of additional
compensation. Yet, empowering the victim by way of
putting money toward ameliorating the problem was
centuries away.
.English statutes that date as far back as the thirteenth
century allow for double and treble damages. 62 In addition
to allowing plaintiffs to collect damages beyond their
physical loss, the Crown also assessed fines against
wrongdoers. 63 These fines were called "amercements" and
57. THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 500 (G.R. Driver & John C. Miles trans., eds.,
1952) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The HistoricalContinuity of
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. REV.

1269, 1285 (1993).
59. THE BABYLONIAN LAWS, supranote 57, at 500.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 274 (1989). For a more detailed explanation of treble damages, see 25
C.J.S. Damages § 218 (2005).
63. Browning-FerrisIndus. of Vt., Inc., 492 U.S. at 269-70.
Amercements were an 'all-purpose' royal penalty; they were used not
only against plaintiffs who failed to follow the complex rules of
pleading and against defendants who today would be liable in tort, but
also against an entire township which failed to live up to its
obligations, or against a sheriff who neglected his duties. The use of
amercements was widespread; one commentary has said that most
men in England could expect to be amerced at least once a year.
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as explained by the United States Supreme Court, "were
payments to the Crown, and were required of individuals
who were 'in the Kings mercy,' because of some act offensive
to the Crown. ' 64 By way of comparison, amercements are
similar to the fines imposed by criminal and administrative
law, more so than civil.65 Thus, amercements mirror
modern day split-recovery statutes wherein states take a
portion of the plaintiffs punitive award. 66 Like split
recovery, amercements are antithetical to the concept of
curative damages. It is illogical for the state to benefit when
it takes no steps toward correcting the problem and bears
no expense in the litigation. The modern doctrine of
punitive damages is more closely related to curative
damages than amercements are.
While double and treble damages existed in early
English jurisprudence, 67 the first case involving modern
punitive damages appeared thirteen years before America
obtained independence. In Wilkes v. Wood,68 the Court of
Common Pleas in England heard a case involving an illegal
search and seizure. The court held that "[w]hen we consider
the persons concerned in this affair, it ceases to be an
outrage to [the victim] personally, it is an outrage to the
constitution itself."69 The court then concluded that
"[diamages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the
injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty,
to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a
proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself. '70
While the court's reasoning that the illegal search and
seizure was an affront to England, it notably awarded the
damages to the victim, rather than as a fine payable to the
Crown. 71 This progression acknowledged the plaintiffs right
to collect the punitive award simply because the plaintiff
64. Id. at 269.
65. However, as discussed in Part III infra, the concept of amercements
whereby a government can take due to a wrong against a private party
reappears in split recovery.
66. See infra Part III.A.
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
68. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
69. Id. at 490.
70. Id. at 498-99.
71. See id.
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was the harmed party, and it was the plaintiff, not the
state, that took the time and expense to sue the defendant.
Similarly, in Huckle v. Money,72 the court refused to
grant a new trial on the ground of excessive damages in a
trespass, assault, and unlawful imprisonment case. The
court gave great deference to the jury's determination of
additional damages, noting "it is very dangerous for the
Judges to intermeddle in damages for torts . . . . 73 The
court explained that to grant a new trial based on
excessiveness, the award must be "glaring" and "all
mankind at first blush must think so.' ' 74 This standard, in
75
variation, still exists today.
Punitive damages first appeared in the United States in
1784 in South Carolina. In Genay v. Norris,76 the court
upheld punitive damages assessed against a physician for
poisoning the drink of a "foreigner"77 after an unsuccessful
duel. The trial court noted that the plaintiff suffered a "very
serious injury" 78 and "such a one as entitled him to very
exemplary damages." 79 Seven years later, New Jersey's
highest court allowed punitive damages against a
defendant who breached a promise of marriage.80 The court
upheld the trial judge's instructions that the jury should
not only consider the actual loss, but also to make an
example of the defendant and to compensate the plaintiff
bride-to-be for the hardship she would suffer in the future
due to the defendant's breach. 8 ' The jury was told "not to
estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering or
actual loss; but to give damages for example's sake, to
prevent such offences in future; and also to allow liberal
damages for. . . the great disadvantages which must follow

72. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
73. Id. at 769.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996).
76. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784).
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791), availableat 1791 WL 380 (N.J.).
81. Id.
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to her through life. '8 2 The punitive damages in this case
served both the function of deterrence as well as victim
compensation.
Recovery for emotional harm as well as pain and
83
suffering was often not recognized in early tort cases.
Thus, as one commentator explains, "[t]he origin of punitive
damages may in fact be compensatory rather than punitive.
Judges crafted the category of exemplary damages as a
justification for affirming jury awards that exceeded the
tangible losses when the award seemed appropriate given
'8 4
other losses not then compensable under the law.
However, as time passed, compensatory damages evolved to
compensate for pain and suffering and other intangible
losses. Yet, despite these new categories of compensatory
damages, punitive damages have remained.8 5 By the middle
of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of the United
States declared that "[i]t is a well-established principle of
the common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions
on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a
defendant ....."86 As of 1875, the Court stated that "the
doctrine is too well settled now to be shaken, that
exemplary damages may in certain cases be assessed. 8 7 Yet
not all states were pleased with these assertions. Many
courts voiced their disapproval of the intrusion of criminal

82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424,
437 n.11 (2001) ("Until well into the 19th century, punitive damages frequently
operated to compensate for intangible injuries, compensation which was not
otherwise available under the narrow conception of compensatory damages
prevalent at the time."); see also Sylvia M. Demarest & David E. Jones,
Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in the
Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797, 801 (1987) ("Exemplary damages were
also historically justified as a means for the jury to compensate for elements of
damages not otherwise recoverable at common law. These elements included
inconvenience, attorneys' fees . .. and other losses too remote to be considered
under actual damages.").
84. Kelly, supra note 56, at 1429-30.
85. But see supra note 39.
86. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852).
87. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492 (1875).
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law into civil.88 In one of the most famous anti-doctrinal
quotes, Judge Foster of the Supreme Judicial Court of New
Hampshire declared punitive damages to be "a monstrous
heresy. '8 9 Mincing no words, he questioned, "[i]s not
punishment out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional,
unjust, unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous, when
classed among civil remedies? What kind of a civil remedy
for the plaintiff is the punishment of the defendant? The
idea is wrong."90
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Colorado, while
conceding that the doctrine of punitive damages "has taken
deep root in the law"91 provided an example to illustrate
their discontent with the doctrine. Using the hypothetical
situation of being assaulted and insulted in public, the
court noted that
five dollars may fully compensate the injury inflicted to my person
and clothing; but $500 may be utterly inadequate to requite the
sense of insult, the personal indignity, the public disgrace and
humiliation. The extra $500 exacted may operate indirectly as
punishment. It may constitute an example to others, and also
deter my assailant himself from repetitions of the offense in the
future. In law, however, it is simply compensation for the private
wrong; a kind of indemnity which, probably, no court has ever
refused to allow when warranted by the circumstances. But under
the doctrine of exemplary damages, as announced by the
instruction given in this case, the jury are not required to stop
with the five dollars for material injury and $500 for lacerated
feelings; they may turn to the domain of criminal law, and
consider the public wrong, and they may add $1,000 more as a

88. Many legal scholars were split on the issue as well. See GEORGE W.
FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 65-66 (1876) (citing THEODORE
SEDGWICK, SEDGWICK ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 525-32 (4th ed. 1868) and
SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 253, 244 (3rd ed. 1850))

("The doctrine of exemplary or punitive damages is entirely ignored by Mr.
Greenleaf .... While on the other hand, Mr. Sedgwick, in his valuable work on
Damages, denies the limited rule laid down by Mr. Greenleaf; and maintains
the doctrine of exemplary or punitive damages.").
89. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872).
90. Id. But see Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 553 (1872) (awarding a party
that was spat on $1,000 in exemplary damages, noting "the law, as far as it
may, should afford substantial protection . . . in the way of liberal damages,
that the public tranquility may be preserved by saving the necessity of resort to
personal violence as the only means of redress").
91. Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 119 (Colo. 1884).
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punishment to my assailant. The arrangement is highly
satisfactory to me, since I have the pleasure of pocketing the
additional $1,000 to which I am not entitled; but as we have
92
already seen, it hardly comports with correct legal principles.

Despite these early Drotests. the doctrine of nunitive
damages remains intact in most states.93 In the last few
decades the Sunreme Court of the United States has
continuallv broadened its recognition of nunitive damaves. 94
and unheld
repeated constitutional challenges against their
95
validity.
92. Id. at 123-24.
93. Currently Nebraska is the only state that does not recognize any form of
punitive damages, although other states, including Colorado, Louisiana, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Washington only recognize punitive damages
by specific statute. See Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d
566, 574 (Neb. 1989); see also Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 472 n.1 (Ind.
2003) ("In Nebraska punitive damages are constitutionally prohibited.");
RICHARD L. BLATT, ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & LORI S. NUGENT, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 425 (2005) ("Nebraska
is one of the few states which does not permit the recovery of punitive
damages.").
94. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (holding that a prison guard can
be liable for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
95. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)
("The punitive damages award in this case is certainly large, but.. . we are not
persuaded that the award was so 'grossly excessive' as to be beyond the power of
the State to allow."); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]n this case, [the punitive award] does not cross the
line into the area of constitutional impropriety."); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989) ("[N]either federal common
law nor the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment provides a basis
for disturbing the jury's punitive damages award in this case."); Smith, 461 U.S.
at 35 ("Although there was debate about the theoretical correctness of the
punitive damages doctrine in the latter part of the last century, the doctrine
was accepted as settled law by nearly all state and federal courts, including this
Court."); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 58, at 1284 ("The punitive award has
been a 'settled doctrine in England and in the general jurisprudence of the
country' for more than two hundred years."); see also Cooper Indus., Inc., v.
Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (holding that the Court of Appeals
should review punitive damages with a de novo standard); Bankers Life & Cas.
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) (upholding a Mississippi statute that
imposed a penalty on a party that unsuccessfully appealed from a punitive
damages award). But see Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007)
(limiting punitive damages when a jury metes out the award based not just on
harm done to the plaintiff, but based on harm to nonparties); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003) ("[A]n award of $145
million in punitive damages, where full compensatory damages are $1 million,
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The doctrine of nunitive damages remained relativelv
low-profile for many years. But, in the late 1960s,
"American courts radically expanded the availability of
punitive damages beyond traditional intentional torts.
96
Lesser misconduct could now merit punitive damages.
The allowance of lower standards for the recovery of
punitive damages increased many damages awards in
97
litigation. By the 1990s, concerns about "lawsuit abuse"
and lawsuits being transformed into "lotteries"98 were
highly prevalent. Justice Sandra Day O'Conner declared
"[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing 99 and two
years later, Justice Blackmun wrote "[w]e note once again
our concern about punitive damages that 'run wild."' 100
The negative attention surrounding punitive damages
may suggest that the doctrine should be eliminated from
modern jurisprudence, or at least significantly limited. But,
without punitive damages, our civil system would require
serious alteration in order to effectuate justice for plaintiffs
who were egregiously wronged in monetarily immeasurable
ways.

III. ATTEMPTS TO REFORM PUNITIVE DAMAGES
As a result of the perception that punitive damages are
out of control, states have tinkered with different methods

is excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) ("[W~e are fully convinced that the grossly
excessive award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional limit.").
96. Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, I'll Take That:
Legal and Public Policy Problems Raised by Statutes That Require Punitive
Damages Awards to be Shared with the State, 68 MO. L. REv. 525, 528 (2003).
97. Saundra Torry, Tort and Retort: The Battle Over Reform Heats Up,
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at F7.

98. Nicholas M. Miller, Note, Tis Better to Give Than To Receive: Charitable
Donations of Medical MalpracticePunitive Damages, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 141, 144
(1997-98) ("[T]he entire tort system.. . resembles a 'lottery' for all involved.").
99. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
100. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 18.
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to assert control. In addition to damages caps, 101 several
states have implemented split-recovery systems.
A. Split Recovery
Split-recovery legislation enables a state to collect a set
portion of the punitive damages award. Yet, split-recovery
statutes are antithetical to the concept of curative damages
because, rather than ameliorate the problem that led to the
award, most states use split recovery to pad their budget's
shortcomings. 10 2 Additionally, split recovery is a strange
modification to the doctrine of punitive damages because,
unlike curative damages, which put the plaintiffs needs
first, it ignores the aggrieved party.
In a 1983 dissent, Justice Rehnquist explained,
"[p]unitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to
plaintiffs, who are entitled to receive full compensation for
their injuries-but no more." He then continued, "[e]ven
assuming that a punitive 'fine' should be imposed after a
civil trial, the penalty should go to the state, not to the
plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated." 103 Yet,
under this theory, if taking money away from the defendant
were the only purpose, why not treat the money like
contraband and burn it?104 Even with split recovery, states

101. For more information about damage caps in tort cases, see Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 58, at 1277-83.
102. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5(a) (West 2006) (repealed July 1, 2006)
("Extraordinary and dire budgetary needs have forced the enactment of this
extraordinary measure."); see also Tom Murray Interview, supra note 11.
103. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S.CAL. L. R. 1,11 (1982). Professor Ellis asserted:
If wealth is taken from a defendant to achieve retribution or deterrence
or for other reasons, we must do something with the money. It could be
destroyed as is often done with confiscated contraband, deposited in
the public treasury as are fines, donated to an object of our
benevolence, or randomly distributed. That none of these uses has been
chosen may reflect society's decision that the best use of the wealth
acquired through punitive-damages the use that will result in the
greatest increase in welfare, utility, or happiness-is to compensate
plaintiffs for losses or attorney's fees.
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still recognize that it is important to allow the plaintiff to
personally collect some amount of the award.
In the mid-1980s, several states began 05adopting splitIndiana,106
Currently, Alaska,1
statutes.
recovery
1
0
7
0
8
s
Missouri,
and Oregon
have laws that require all
plaintiffs to split their punitive award with the state.
Georgia, 10 9 Iowa, 110 and Illinois"' require plaintiffs in
specific actions to split their award. Two states, Ohio 112 and
Alabama, 113 have had unique, judicially-created solutions
for allocation of punitive damages. Meanwhile, four states,
California, 114 Florida, 115 Kansas, 116 and New York, 117 have
allowed their statutes to sunset, and Colorado" 8 has
declared its split-recovery statute unconstitutional. 119 Most
recently, Utah 20 declared the older version of its splitrecovery statute unconstitutional.
1. States that Require General Split Recovery. On
August 16, 2004, California became the latest state to enact

105. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (2007).
106. IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (2006).

107. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (2007).
108. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2006).
109. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (West 2007).
110. IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (2006).
111. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1207 (2007).

112. See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77,
2002-Ohio-7113, 781 N.E.2d 121, 146 (holding that a special cancer fund should
be created from a portion of the punitive damages).
113. See Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So.2d 685, 698 (Ala. 1996),
overruled by 701 So.2d 524 (Ala. 1997) (holding, and then overruling, that a
portion of punitive damages from all actions, except for wrongful death, should
be apportioned to Alabama's general fund).
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5 (West 2006) (repealed July 1, 2006).
115. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2) (1993) (repealed 1995).
116. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (2004) (repealed 1989).
117. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8701 (McKinney 1992) (repealed 1994).
118. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1994) (repealed 1995).
119. See Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
120. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1989), invalidated by Smith v. Price Dev.
Co., 125 P.3d 945 (Utah 2005).
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a split-recovery statute. 121 The statute allowed the State of
California to keep 75 percent of all punitive damages
awarded until the statute's sunset quickly took effect less
than two years later on July 1, 2006.122 In the original plan,
California allowed attorneys to take their contingency fee
from the 25 percent of the award that was given to
plaintiffs. Critics of this plan argued that "[1]imiting an
attorney to a share of only 25 percent amounts to a taking ....
It forces the attorney to work for free."'1 23 However, before
the enactment of the law, the proposal was amended to
allow the attorney to take a contingency fee from the entire
amount awarded. 124 At its inception, critics noted that this
law, like other states' split-recovery laws, "may lead to the
odd result of a lawyer receiving a greater recovery than his
the lawyer the primary beneficiary of
or her client-making
1 25
the award."'
California's split-recovery statute was clear about its
budget-padding intent. The statute's preamble stated,
''extraordinary and dire budgetary needs have forced the

121. See Don G. Rushing & William V. O'Connor Jr., New California Law
Allows for Split-Recovery of Punitive Damages Awards, MORRISON & FOERSTER,
(Apr. 2005), http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update020013.htm.
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5(i) (West 2006) (repealed July 1, 2006) ('This
section shall remain in effect until July 1, 2006, and as of that date is repealed,
unless a later enacted statute extends or deletes that date."). In 2005, Senator
Perata introduced Senate Bill 832 which, when amended, sought to revise and
extend § 3294.5 until June 30, 2011. See S.B. 832, 2005-2006 (Cal. 2006),
available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_08010850/sb_832_bill
20060824_amendedasm.pdf. However, Governor Schwarzenegger refused to
sign the bill, noting that "[w]hile I have been supportive of the policy in the past
... this bill was amended late in the legislative session and did not provide an
opportunity for sufficient hearings to determine whether this policy has been
effective or not." Press Release, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor's
Veto Message (Sept. 30, 2006), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/0506bill/sen/sb_0801850/sb_832 _vt_20060930.html. Split recovery may once
again be a reality in California as Governor Schwarzenegger added, "I
encourage the author to reintroduce the bill next year and allow a full debate on
the effectiveness of the policy." Id.
123. Adam Liptak, Schwarzenegger Sees Money for State in Punitive
Damages, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, at A16 (quoting Robert S. Peck, President,
Center for Constitutional Litigation).
124. See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Op-Ed.,
New California Law Grants State 75% of Punitive Damage Award, 14 WASH.
LEGAL FOUND. 20 (2004).

125. Id.

1608

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

enactment of this extraordinary measure .*.".."126
Interestingly, more than a decade before split recovery
became a reality for California, commentators advocated for
split recovery as a cure for California's "pressing [deficit]
problem."' 127 Oddly, due to the sunset provision in the law,
128
split recovery was only operational for two years.
states
However, many commentators speculate that several
129
may follow in California's "trend-setting" footsteps.
In Evans v. State,130 Alaska defended its split-recovery
statute, enacted in 1997, which allows the State to take half
of a plaintiffs punitive award.13 1 The Supreme Court of
Alaska upheld both the split-recovery statute and a cap
placed on punitive damages. 132 However, as the Supreme
Court of Utah explained, "Evans is without precedential
value because the court was evenly divided, with two
justices voting to affirm the trial court and two voting to
reverse. In Alaska, a split opinion results in an affirmance
but such affirmances have no
of the trial court's 1decision,
33
precedential effect."'
Similar to Alaska, the State of Missouri is authorized
by statute to retain half of the plaintiffs punitive damages
award. 34 The funds are deposited into the State's "tort
victims' compensation fund"'135 and from there, 26 percent of
the award is deposited into the "Legal Services for Low126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5(a) (West 2006) (repealed July 1, 2006).
127. Laura Ritchie et al., Today's Problems/Tomorrow's Lawyers:
Redirecting Punitive Damages, THE RECORDER, May 5, 1993, at 8.
128. See Schwartz, Behrens & Silverman, supra note 124, at 20. See
generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5(a) (West 2006) (repealed July 1, 2006).
129. Schwartz, Behrens & Silverman, supra note 124, at 20.
130. 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002).
131. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (2007). ("If a person receives an award
of punitive damages, the court shall require that 50 percent of the award be
deposited in the general fund of the state.").
132. See Evans, 56 P.3d 1046.
133. Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 125 P.3d 945, 952 n.6 (Utah 2005) (internal
citations omitted).
134. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (2007).
135. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(3) (2007) ("The state of Missouri shall have a
lien for deposit into the tort victim's compensation fund to the extent of fifty
percent of the punitive damage final judgment which shall attach in any such
case after deducting attorney's fees and expenses.").
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Income People Fund."136 In 1997, Missouri's split recovery
statute was challenged in Fust v. Attorney General For
Missouri.137 Upholding Missouri's split-recovery statute, the
court followed other jurisdictions in holding that, among
other things, the plaintiffs had no property interest in the
punitive award because it did not vest.138
Oregon limits both the collection of punitive damages
by the plaintiff and the collection of attorney's fees. 139 Its
split-recovery statute further blurs the line between
criminal and civil law by requiring 60 percent of punitive
awards to be paid into the "Criminal Injuries Compensation
Account."' 140 In 2002, the Supreme Court of Oregon upheld
this statute, determining that plaintiffs have no right to
collect punitive damages.141
In Indiana, a state that does not allow punitive
damages recovery if the defendant is exposed to criminal
liability, 142 plaintiffs are only entitled to 25 percent of their
punitive damages award. 143 This statute was challenged in
2003 after a woman's ex-husband posted nude and sexually
explicit photos of her around their small town. 144 Despite
the fact that the nude photos depicted her and not state
officials, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that she had no
property right to the punitive damages and allowed the
state to keep $75,000 of her $100,000 punitive damages
award. In granting the state's right to take, the court
136. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(5) (2007).

137. 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997).
138. See id.
139. According to OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2006):
Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of punitive damages,
the Department of Justice shall become a judgment creditor as to the
punitive damages portion of the award to which the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account is entitled . . . the punitive damage portion of

an award shall be allocated as follows: (a) Forty percent shall be paid to
the prevailing party. The attorney for the prevailing party shall be paid
out of the amount allocated under this paragraph ... (b) Sixty percent
shall be paid to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account ....
140. Id.

141. See DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232 (Or. 2002).
142. See, e.g., Moore v. Waitt, 298 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ind.Ct. App. 1973).
143. See IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6(c)(1) (2006).

144. See Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467 (Ind.2003).
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reasoned that punitive damages are a common-law
outgrowth, and therefore the legislature is free to eliminate
or restrict their recovery. 145
As seen in Indiana and other states, many issues
surrounding split recovery hinge on when the plaintiffs
interest in collecting punitive damages vests as a property
right. If a state takes its share of a split recovery before a
plaintiff does, then the state's share cannot be considered
plaintiffs property. 146 But an early, automatic taking by the
state may invoke other concerns. For example, a state's
taking of money not considered to belong to a plaintiff could
implicate the tax code. If the state's take did not ever
belong to, or fall under the control of the plaintiff, then the
plaintiff never "earned" it and should not have to pay taxes
on it.147 The current debate over the taxing of attorney
contingent fees provides useful insight into how this issue
might create a situation whereby the state could take its
share, but then tax a plaintiff for the full amount of the
award as if the plaintiff had discretion over its
disposition. 148 Even if the alternate view should prevail that
"[t]here is no statutory requirement that the state pay any
legal fees related to its share of the punitive damage
award,"'149 courts would have to wrestle with Eighth
Amendment considerations.150 When a state takes a cut of a
payment that it did not earn or that a defendant has not
forfeited through criminal activity, has the state exacted an
undeserved punishment on that defendant?
2. States that Require Limited Split Recovery. Some
states modify punitive damages by limiting their
availability to certain torts. For example, Georgia
established a split-recovery statute that requires 75 percent
145. Id. at 472.
146. But see id. at 477 (Dickson, J., dissenting) ("A person's property
interest in a judgment vests upon the entry of that judgment by the trial court,
not upon the eventual payment of the judgment by the judgment debtor.").
147. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940) (explaining what
constitutes control for purposes of earning).
148. See generally Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
149. Cheatham, 789 N.E.2d at 477.
150. For a discussion of Eighth Amendment implications see infra Part
III.A.4.
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of punitive damages that arise from product liability cases
to be turned over to the state treasury. 15 1 The statute was
first challenged in federal court in 1990. In McBride v.
General Motors Co.,152 the court found the product-liability
split-recovery statute unconstitutional and determined that
the State should not take punitive damages away from the
plaintiffs. The court based its holding on the fact that the
statute discriminates between product liability plaintiffs
and other tort plaintiffs and that the statute was "not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."'153 On this
point, the court reasoned that "there can be no legitimate
purpose for a state to involve itself in the area of civil
damages litigation between private parties wherein
punitive damages are a legitimate item of recovery, where
the State, through the legislative
process, preempts for
154
itself a share of the award."'
However, the Supreme Court of Georgia, not bound by
the district court's decision in McBride, 55 upheld the
constitutionality of the statute in Mack Trucks, Inc. v.
Conkle.156 In that case, plaintiff Daniel Conkle was injured
when the truck he was driving overturned after the truck's
frame rail broke. Mr. Conkle was awarded punitive
damages after the jury learned that Mack Trucks could
have fixed a defect in their trucks with a part that cost
$103.00, but chose not to do so. 157 The Supreme Court of
Georgia upheld the split-recovery statute, reasoning that it
was better to "not allo[w] the first plaintiff to reach the
courthouse with a product liability lawsuit to reap a
windfall from the punitive damages," instead requiring
"that three-quarters of the punitive damages awarded be

151. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1-2) (West 2006) ("In a tort case in
which the cause of action arises from product liability ...[s]eventy-five percent
of any amounts awarded under this subsection as punitive damages... shall be
paid into the treasure of the state through the Office of Treasury and Fiscal
Services.").
152. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
153. Id. at 1576.
154. Id. at 1579.
155. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 642 (Ga. 1993)
(Benham, J., dissenting in part).
156. 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
157. See id. at 640.
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paid to the state treasury for the benefit of all Georgia
citizens."' 58 Three years later, the Supreme Court of
Georgia once again upheld Georgia's 159
split-recovery statute
in Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co.
Illinois' legislature left split-recovery apportionments to
its judiciary. The split-recovery statute merely states that
the "trial court may also in its discretion, apportion the
punitive damage award among the plaintiff, the plaintiffs
attorney and the State of Illinois Department of Human
Services."'160 In order to make that determination, the
statute instructs, "[i]n apportioning punitive damages as
provided in this Section, the court shall consider, among
other factors it deems relevant, whether any
special duty
161
was owed by the defendant to the plaintiff."'
In Iowa, if the tortious conduct was directed specifically
162
at the plaintiff, the split-recovery statute is not activated.
163
However, in a case like Moore,
where Conrail did not
specifically intend to kill three teenagers, the split-recovery
statute would activate. Thus, after all of the attorney's fees
and costs are paid, the plaintiff can collect 25 percent and
the remainder goes to fund Iowa's "civil reparations
trust."164 That fund does nothing to correct the problem that
gave rise to the action.
3. Judicial Split Recovery. In a strange outgrowth of
the push for split recovery, the judiciaries in two states took
the law into their own hands and crafted their own brand of
split recovery. In Alabama, after the State Supreme Court
ruled that split recovery was necessary, it did an about-face
following a ruling from the United States Supreme Court.

158. Id. at 638.
159. 476 S.E.2d 565 (Ga. 1996).
160. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1207 (2007).
161. Id.
162. See IOWA CODE § 668A.1(2)(a) (2006) ("If the answer to [whether
conduct of the defendant was directed specifically at the claimant, or at
person from which the claimant's claim is derived], is affirmative, the
amount of the punitive or exemplary damages awarded shall be paid to
claimant.").
163. See supra Introduction.
164. IOWA CODE § 668A.1(2)(b) (2006).

the
the
full
the
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In Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Johnson,165 the Alabama
Supreme Court heard a case involving Daisey Johnson. Ms.
Johnson was a senior citizen with a third grade education
who had been a customer of the insurance company, Life of
Georgia, for over twenty-five years. 166 Heeding the
company's unofficial policy to "Get the money,"'167 her agent
used fear to sell her a useless medical policy. 168 When Ms.
Johnson found out that she had been paying almost onethird of her entire fixed income for a worthless policy, the
eighty-four-year-old took to physically chasing insurance
agents off of her property when they came to collect
payments. 169 The Supreme Court upheld $5 million in
punitive damages 70 and stated, "we now hold that a part of
punitive damages awarded in future cases (excluding cases
based on wrongful death) shall be paid into the state
general fund."' 7' The court reasoned that "this practice will
strengthen the public's confidence in our civil justice
system, because, under this procedure, wrongdoers can be
appropriately discouraged from inflicting harm1 72
upon others
without inappropriately rewarding the victim.'
Yet split recovery was not to be in Alabama. That case,
along with several other Alabama cases, were granted
certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States. 173
After judgment in the Johnson case was vacated and
remanded to the Alabama Supreme Court, the landscape of
punitive damages had changed. The Supreme Court of the
United States decided BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 74 and set forth a three-prong test to determine

165. 684 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1996), overruled by Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson,
701 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1997).
166. Id. at 687.
167. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 529 (Ala. 1997).
168. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d at 692.
169. Id. at 688, 690.
170. The jury had assessed damages of $12.5 million.
171. Johnson, 684 So. 2d at 698.
172. Id. at 698-99.
173. See Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 923 (1996).
174. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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whether a punitive award was considered excessive. 175
Therefore, on remand, the Supreme Court of Alabama
overruled its one-year-old proposal and held, "the principled
approach to the question of excessive punitive damages,
required by the Supreme Court of the United States in
BMW, will keep plaintiffs from receiving windfalls in
punitive damages, and ... there is no longer any reason for
diverting some of the punitive damages to the State."'176
Just as quickly as split recovery came to be in Alabama, it
was gone.
In Ohio, Justice Pfiefer, who offered praise for the
Moores and upheld the punitive award in the Wightman
case, created his own blend of split recovery and curative
damages. In Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross Blue
Shield,177 Robert Dardinger, as executor of his wife's estate,
sued her medical insurance company for breach of contract
and bad faith denial. His wife, Esther, had cancerous
tumors in her brain. 178 Despite the severity of her disease,
she
was
showing
improvement
on intra-arterial
chemotherapy. 179 The improvement was marked enough
that she was able to lead a relatively normal life and even
go on a vacation where she hiked with her husband and
children. 8 0 However, after several treatments, her
insurance company, Anthem, using a review panel
consisting of one doctor who was not apprised of her success
with the treatment,
denied further intra-arterial
treatments, deeming them experimental.l1 Knowing the
cost of the treatment would bankrupt her family, Mrs.
Dardinger chose to try a different treatment while her
appeal was pending.182 While Anthem deliberately
lengthened the appeal process, Esther's condition declined
175. See id. at 574-75 ("[T]he degree of reprehensibility .. .the disparity
between the harm or potential harm suffered ...and [the] punitive damages
award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.").
176. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 535 (Ala. 1997).
177. 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 77 2002-Ohio-7113, 781 N.E.2d 121.
178. See id. at 77.
179. See id. at 78.
180. See id. at 80.
181. See id. at 79.
182. See id. at 81.
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sharply. 8 3 The day after her funeral,
Anthem's rejection of
8 4
her appeal arrived in her mailbox.'
Shocked by the callousness Anthem displayed, Justice
Pfiefer wrote in his scathing opinion that: "[Anthem]
created hope, then snatched it away. They took a dignified
death from Esther Dardinger and filled her last days with
frustration, doubt, and desperation. And every minute of
additional pain suffered by Esther Dardinger was a natural
outgrowth of the defendant's practiced powerlessness, their
active inactivity."'' 8 5 Then, Justice Pfiefer did something
unprecedented. Citing the "philosophical void" between the
reasons punitive damages are awarded and how they are
distributed, 8 6 Pfiefer praised the curative damages in the
Wightman decision and awarded a large portion of the
punitive damages to a cancer research fund18 7the court
created especially for Esther Dardinger's award.
This decision shocked many people, including the
victim's husband who was essentially "ordered to make a
$20 million charitable donation.' 88 In this way, the judicial
allocation of an award to charity was not true to the concept
of curative damages because the court took autonomy away
from the victim. Mr. Dardinger, who had already decided to
set up a foundation in memory of his wife, 8 9 was reportedly
disturbed by the court's decision because he "worrie[d] that
the controversy over the ruling [would] overshadow the

183. See id. at 82, 85.
184. See id. at 85.
185. Id. at 98.
186. See id. at 104.
187. The jury awarded $49 million to Dardinger. The Supreme Court
reduced the amount to $30 million and allowed Robert Dardinger to collect $10
million, his attorneys to collect their fees from the entire amount, and allocated
the remainder to the Esther Dardinger Fund and the James Cancer Hospital
and Solove Research Institute at The Ohio State University. See id. at 105.
188. Adam Liptak, Court Dictates How to Spend Award, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2002, at A12.
189. See Peter Page, Court Creates Charity Funded by Punitives: Damages
from a Big Case Are Diverted to the Fund, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A4.
("Palmer, the plaintiff's counsel, said that while it was novel for the court to
order creation of a memorial charity in Esther Dardinger's name, it was what
his client had intended to do with any punitive award he would have received.").
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court's rebuke of Anthem."'190 But more than that, Mr.
Dardinger did not feel that the trust created by the court fit
the problem he wanted to see solved. He told the media that
"[h]e would have preferred to help people with cancer,
too,"'191 noting that .'[t]here ought to be some kind of safety
net . . . for people in the same situation as my wife and I,
where medical procedures
are needed but denied by the
192
insurance company."
However, it appeared that once the court-created trust
was in place, Mr. Dardinger supported the decision. In a
press release issued by the newly created Dardinger NeuroOncology Center, Mr. Dardinger was quoted as saying, "'by
using this money to establish the Esther Dardinger NeuroOncology Center... we will help achieve the result my wife
hoped for. While undergoing treatment, she expressed the
belief that, regardless of the outcome of her fight, if doctors
could learn from93her treatment, some good might come from
her situation."' 1
Beyond the court-created trust, Mr. Dardinger used his
portion of punitive damages as curative damages. 94 He
became a major benefactor of his alma mater, and set up
funds and scholarships not only in his wife's name, but also
in the name of his twin brother who was killed in a college
airplane accident. 195
190. Scott Hiaasen, Court Took New Power With Split of Punitive Award;
Critics Say Justices Can Now Aid Pet Causes, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 5, 2003, at

Al.
191. Liptak, supranote 188, at A12.
192. Id. (quoting Robert Dardinger).
193. Press Release, Comprehensive Cancer Center Arthur G. James Cancer
Hospital and Richard J. Solove Research Institute at The Ohio State
University, Dardinger Neuro-Oncology
Center Opens,
available at
http://www.jamesline.com/research/programs/index.cfm?ID=1629
(quoting
Robert Dardinger).
194. "Curative damages" is used loosely here, as it would be most beneficial
if Mr. Dardinger had the opportunity to donate his award to help people with
cancer who were denied treatment, state his intent in court, and bind these
donations as part of the litigation.
195. After the punitive damages were distributed, Robert endowed three
scholarships to Marshall University and made Marshall University's "Big
Green Scholarship Foundation" the irrevocable beneficiary on his charitable
remaining trust. See Bob Withers, Alumnus gives $1M donation to Marshall,
HERALD-DISPATCH.COM,
Sept. 10, 2005, http://www.herald-dispatch.com
/apps/pbcs.dllarticle?AID=/20050910/NEWSO1/509100320;
Press
Release,
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After the decision, many commentators both praised
and condemned the court's action. This decision fueled the
controversy over split recovery. One commentator asserted
that while legislatures have the right to limit split recovery,
the judiciary does not. 196 Meanwhile, another commentator
contended that courts, along with plaintiffs, should be
197
allowed to assign punitive damages, not the legislature. 198
And while Justice Pfiefer stood by his decision,
constitutional questions brought about by split recovery,
both legislatively-created and judicially-created, were
renewed.
4. Split Recovery Is Unfair to the Plaintiff and Does Not
Comport with the Constitution. Split recovery, whether
statutorily or judicially-created, does not reform punitive
damages. It merely pads states' budgets while eviscerating
the plaintiffs autonomy. This creates a skewed result
whereby, "the State did nothing to earn its [monetary]
share of the punitive damage award; and a nexus between
deterrence and the forced contribution from the injured
person is absent."'199 Moreover, the state "has not only done
nothing to advance the litigation, but has not protected the
public from [the harm] and will not be obliged to use the
windfall to benefit those damaged by the same [harm]. "200

Marshall University, From Tragedy to Triumph: Dardingers Join MU's
Pathway of Prominence (Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://www.marshall.edu/
ucomm/RELEASE/2005/pr090705.htm. The plane accident that claimed Mr.
Dardinger's twin brother's life was recently the focus of the major movie release
WE ARE MARSHALL (Warner Bros. Pictures, 2006).
196. See generally Jessica Nielsen, Note, A True Hollywood Story:
Alternative Distributions and the Ohio Supreme Court's Dardinger v. Anthem
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 815 (2003).

197. See generally C.J. Martin, Note, Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross &
Blue Shield: Judicial Redistribution of Punitive Damage Awards, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1649 (2003).

198. See Leonard, supra note 35, at C2. ("Pfeifer said the establishment of a
special fund works only for large awards. 'The whole purpose of punitive
damages is to punish the defendant enough so it changes the bad conduct ....
These cases don't come along all that often. I think we exercised good judgment
here."').
199. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 803 (Fla. 1992) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
200. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 641 (Ga. 1993) (Benham,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Additionally, split-recovery statutes impermissibly blur
the line between criminal law and civil law. 20 1 "[T]he effect
of a civil judgment for punitive damages is not the same as
that of a fine imposed after a conviction for a crime, since
the successful plaintiff and not the state is entitled to the
money .... ,,202 In essence, split recovery downplays the
plaintiffs role in civil litigation. 203 Accordingly, "the party
who brings a civil suit in a court of law" 20 4 is no longer the
party entitled to benefit from that suit. Many commentators
fear that allowing the state to become "free riders" 205 on the
backs of the plaintiffs, will limit plaintiffs' abilities to
secure representation and to be afforded justice. 20 6
There are also strong constitutional arguments why
states should not have the right to reallocate punitive
damages. If civil fines are diverted from plaintiffs to the
state, both plaintiffs' and defendants' constitutional rights
are jeopardized. The Fifth Amendment protects against
unjust takings, yet split-recovery statutes wrongly take a
plaintiffs property. If the courts determine that the award
201. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
297 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Punitive
damages are private fines levied by civil juries.") (internal quotations omitted);
Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1078 (Alaska 2002) (Bryner, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
tort system allows individual litigants to resolve disputes involving private
harms between themselves, without calling on the state to intervene on behalf
of either party."); Town of Hopkinton v. B.F. Sturtevant Co., 189 N.E. 107, 108
(Mass. 1934) ("It is to be remembered that the main purpose of civil litigation is
to do justice between the parties.").
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a. (1979).
203. See Editorial, Unfair Taking; Punitive Damages: State Should Keep its
Greedy Mitts Off, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 6, 2005, at A14. ("The state does not
assume any of the burden of filing the lawsuit or suffering through the
emotionally excruciating months or years of depositions, testimony and legal
wrangling while the wheel of justice grinds slowly.").
204. See the definition of "plaintiff' in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1171 (7th
ed. 1999).
205. Schwartz, Behrens & Silverman, supra note 96, at 526.
206. See Patrick White, Note, The Practical Effects of Split-Recovery
Statutes and Their Validity as a Tool of Modern Day 'Tort Reform," 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 593, 604 (2002) ("Of the two options of who should get the money, the
plaintiff who endures the hardship of litigation or the government who does
nothing, the plaintiff is the deserving party."); The Roundtable Responds to H.B.
1741's Changes in Punitive Awards, THE IND. LAW., MAY 17-30, 1995 at 1, 7
("Why should complainant go to trial to expose the wrongdoer when the
potential punitive damage reward is so modest?").
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is not the property of the plaintiff, then Eighth Amendment
protection kicks in. The Eighth Amendment protects
against excessive fines, yet split recovery unlawfully takes
money from a defendant and gives it to a state.
Indeed, two states have found split recovery
unconstitutional. As recently as December 2005, the
Supreme Court of Utah struck down the 1989 version of
split-recovery law in Smith v. Price Development
Utah's
Co. 20 7 The attorney for the plaintiff declared that, '[i]t's a
remarkable day for justice in the country . . . [i]t's 208a
remarkable day for the little man and justice.' 20 9
Additionally, in 1995, in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co.,
the Supreme Court of Colorado determined that Colorado's
split-recovery statute "effectuates a forced taking of the
judgment creditor's property interest in the judgment ....,,210
Similarly, Florida, 21 l Kansas, 21 2 and New York 21 3 have all
repealed their split-recovery statutes.
Despite these criticisms and rulings, the Supreme
Court of the United States, while aware of the concept of

207. 125 P.3d 945 (Utah 2005).
208. Geoffrey Fattah, High Court Says Utah Can't Take 50% of N.M.
Couple's Award, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Dec. 3, 2005 (quoting Robert
Campbell); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (2006). But see Editorial, supra
note 203, at A14. ("Because the Supreme Court did not rule on the latest
version of the law, in which the state still confiscates 50 percent of the amount
of punitive damages in excess of $20,000, its constitutionality remains an open
question.").
209. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
210. Id. at 264. However, several jurisdictions have declined to follow
Colorado's reasoning because it was based on the wording of the statute which,
unlike some other states, vested the property interest of the judgment to the
plaintiff first, before the state was allowed to take. However, while the Supreme
Court of Colorado's reasoning was largely based on the technicality of vesting,
the court also noted that, "an exemplary damages award is not totally devoid of
any and all reparative elements." Id. at 270.
211. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (1993) (repealed 1995); see also FLA. HOUSE
OF REP., HOUSE OF REP. STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 775, 6 (1999) ("On July 1, 1995, the

provision which required a split of punitive damage awards was repealed ....
212. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (2004) (repealed 2005).
213. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8701 (McKinney 1992) (repealed 1994) ("In any civil
action resulting in an award of punitive damages to a private party, other than
an award rendered against the state, upon expiration of the time to appeal or
the exhaustion of available appeals, twenty percent of such punitive damage
award shall be payable to the state ...").
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split recovery, has never made a ruling on its
constitutionality. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group,214 60 percent of the punitive damages awarded
to Leatherman were put into Oregon's Criminal Injury
Compensation Account as part of that state's split-recovery
statute. 215 While this was noted in the decision, no comment
was made nor was this an issue in the case. Similarly, in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,216 Justice Ginsburg
attached an appendix to her dissent explicating the
regulations that each state puts on punitive damages. Splitrecovery statutes were listed under the heading "Allocation
of Punitive Damages to State Agencies. 21 7
If the Supreme Court of the United States should ever
review split recovery, Fifth Amendment "taking" concerns
may take a backseat to Eighth Amendment "excessive
fines" problems.
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided an Eighth
Amendment case in a way that appears to raise questions
about the constitutionality of split recovery. In Browning218
Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
a garbage disposal company tried to put a former
employee's new company out of business. There, the Court
rejected the argument that the Eighth Amendment applied
because civil litigation is between two parties and does not
benefit the government. The court stated that it
need not go so far as to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause
applies just to criminal cases. Whatever the outer confines of the
Clause's reach may be, we now decide only that it does not
constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the
action
nor has any right to
government neither has prosecuted the 21
9
receive a share of the damages awarded.

Additionally, in finding that the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause was not applicable to punitive
damages, the Court reasoned, "[Excessive Fines] concerns
214. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).

215. Id. at 429.
216. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
217. Id. at 616-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
218. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
219. Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added).
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are clearly inapposite in a case where a private party
receives exemplary damages from another party, and the
government has no share in the recovery. '220 Thus, there is
dicta to support the notion that split recovery statutes do
not comport with the Constitution.
B. OtherAttempts to Reform Punitive Damages
There have been several attempts and suggestions on
how to reform punitive damages. A plan has been proposed
to divide punitive damages between the plaintiff and the
non-profit sector. 221 As part of this plan, the plaintiff is
empowered to choose the non-profit organization to which
the allocation will be made, subject to approval by the court.
The challenge with this model is that the division still
constitutes a taking222 because the plaintiff does not have
complete autonomy over the funds. If the plaintiff wanted
to give half of the proceeds to a controversial cause, the
court may prevent her or him from doing so. Additionally,
the plaintiff may be precluded from giving the funds to an
entity that is not construed as a charity, such as a political
candidate that may bring about some type of needed
reform. Most of all, forced giving does little to effectuate
positive change for the plaintiff. Rather than the plaintiff
having a vested interest in seeing the money do good, giving
becomes a mandatory obligation.
Another suggestion is to create a system which
completely eradicates a plaintiffs involvement with
punitive damages. In that system, a judge evaluates each
civil case to determine whether, as a matter of law, the
alleged wrong subjects the defendant to a punitive damages
claim. If the jury determines punitive damages are
appropriate, they will be directly awarded to a state fund. 223
220. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
221. See Dede W. Welles, Note, Charitable Punishment: A Proposal to
Award Punitive Damages to Nonprofit Organizations,9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.

203 (1998); see also Miller, supra note 98 (advocating a plan to require victims
of medical malpractice to share their punitive awards with charities).
222. Not necessarily a "legal" taking, but a taking nonetheless.
223. See James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall
Away From the Plaintiff-An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1130, 1137-42 (1992)

(proposing that punitive damage awards be placed into "a special compensation
fund for victorious plaintiffs that are unable to collect against insolvent
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With this plan, a plaintiff will be allowed to litigate the case
up to collecting compensatory damages and then "the state
would take responsibility for the litigation of punitive
' 224
damages since the plaintiff has no stake in the award.
This model already exists. It is called our criminal justice
system. By removing the plaintiff from the litigation as the
commentator proposes, it merely transforms a civil lawsuit
into a criminal trial whereby the state prosecutes the
defendant in an attempt to obtain a guilty verdict replete
with a fine. This proposal needlessly blurs the lines
between criminal and civil litigation and devalues the
plaintiffs initial outlay of emotional energy, financial
support, and time put into entering the litigation process,
merely to allow a state and unrelated victims to collect the
punitive damages.
Lastly, Professor Catherine Sharkey proposes a new
class
of damages
termed
"compensatory
societal
damages." 225 She advocates for a bifurcation of trial. If a
jury determines, after awarding compensatory damages,
that the defendant was indeed reckless, the fact-finder
would then hear evidence from other individuals who had
been harmed by the defendant. If the fact-finder determines
that punitive damages are warranted, all of those harmed
by the defendant's
conduct are entitled to share in the
226
punitive award.
As Professor Sharkey concedes, this model may be
challenging because not only will it be difficult to sort
through false claims, but it is also difficult to determine
who has been harmed. For example, in the Moore case, who
else would have been able to share in the punitive damages
award? Anyone involved in a railroad crossing collision?
The passengers in the Moore's car? Anyone injured at that
particular crossing? While this model may work well for
large cases in which multiple people were identically

defendants"); see also Grube, supra note 56, at 851 ("If some entity must be
compensated for the malicious, aggravated, or outrageous conduct of the
defendant, it should be society rather than the plaintiff.").
224. Breslo, supra note 223, at 1148.
225. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113
YALE L.J. 347, 389 (2003).
226. Id. at 405.
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harmed, but no class action has occurred, 227 it does little to
effectuate justice for victims who have been privately
wronged and may be forced to share their award.
Moreover, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams,22s the
Supreme Court of the United States held that "the
Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a
punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury
that it inflicts upon nonparties ....
This holding, which
attempts to limit punitive damages by not allowing
plaintiffs to be reimbursed for wrongs done to "strangers to
the
litigation,"230
abrogates
the
practicality
of
"compensatory societal damages. ' 231 Under this holding, in
order to get a fair trial, the defendant must have an
opportunity to defend against each nonparty victim. This
would be impractical and impossible in Professor Sharkey's
suggested scenario.
",229

IV. THE BENEFITS OF AWARDING PLAINTIFFS PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

While curative damages do not solve the larger
questions demanded by critics who fear that litigation has
become a lottery, in order for curative damages to be
effective, the doctrine of punitive damages must remain
intact. Indeed, the doctrine of punitive damages is critical
for three key reasons: first, unlike predictable damage caps,
punitive damages prevent wealthy corporations from
232
engaging in cost-benefit analysis with people's lives;
second, punitive damages provide an incentive to victims
and their attorneys to endure lengthy, draining, and costly
litigation; and third, they provide victims the control with
which to fix the harm.

227. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (explaining class action lawsuits).
228. 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007).
229. Id. at 1063.
230. Id.
231. Sharkey, supranote 225, at 389.
232. Cf. Meredith Matheson Thoms, Comment, Punitive Damages in Texas:
Examining the Need for a Split-Recovery Statute, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 207 (2003)
(arguing that split recovery is more beneficial in tort reform than caps on
punitive damages).
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A. Why Punitive Damages are Important
Punitive damages play a very significant and important
role in our society. 233 Aside from notions of punishment and
deterrence, their practicality lies in their ability to generate
private law enforcement, encourage attorneys to take cases
with limited compensatory damages,
and prevent
corporations from
engaging
in
cost-benefit
analysis with
2 34
people's lives.

We do not have the governmental resources to publicly
police corporations or to uncover every wrongdoing in our
society. Additionally, many egregious wrongs are not
classified as crimes. Without individuals who are willing to
endure years of litigation-related burdens, 235 our society as
a whole loses. Products would become dangerous, fraud
would proliferate, and wrongful acts could be committed
with impunity. Punitive damages are the incentive it takes
236
for many attorneys to take on otherwise costly litigation.
Often referred to as the "private attorney general"
incentive, 237 punitive damages give individuals the
financial incentive to bring litigation to fruition. The
Supreme Court has long recognized their value, noting
"[p]unitive damages are justified as a 'bounty' that
233. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 11 (4th ed.
1971) ("[Punitive damages] have been defended as a salutary method of
discouraging evil motives, as a partial remedy for the defect in American civil
procedure which denies compensation for actual expenses of litigation, such as
counsel fees, and as an incentive to bring into court and redress a long array of
petty cases of outrage and oppression which in practice escape the notice of
prosecuting attorneys occupied with serious crime, and which a private
individual would otherwise find not worth the trouble and expense of a
lawsuit.")
234. See Ellis, supra note 104, at 3.
235. See Editorial, supra note 203, at A14 ("The state does not assume any
of the burden of filing the lawsuit or suffering through the emotionally
excruciating months or years of depositions, testimony, and legal wrangling
while the wheel of justice grinds slowly.").
236. See Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685, 693 (Ala. 1996),
overruled by 701 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1997) ("Attorneys . . .usually bear all of the
expense of the litigation and carry all of the risk of failure. They are reimbursed
only if the victim recovers from the wrongdoer. The lawyer takes a significant
risk in such cases.").
237. For a discussion of the "private attorney general" function of punitive
damages see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 58, at 1322-26.
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encourages private lawsuits seeking to assert legal
rights. ' 238 Without this bounty, it often will not be
financially feasible for victims to sue.
More importantly, punitive damages punish defendants
in accordance to the potential harm they cause, not
necessarily for actual damage. In a famous example cited by
the Supreme Court, 239 a commentator illustrates how
compensatory damages can bear little, if any, relation to the
size of the harm: "the grossly negligent hunter may shoot
into a crowd of people and only break a ten-dollar pair of
eye glasses. The admonition meted out to him should
be the
'240
same as though he had killed or injured someone.
Punitive damages have the ability to measure the
wrongdoing so that potential defendants cannot engage in
cost-benefit analysis with human lives. This flexibility is
critical, as punitive damages are "one of the few effective
social control devices used to patrol large powerful interests
unimpeded by the criminal law."'24 1 One of the worst
examples of this type of deadly cost-benefit analysis was
performed by a major automobile manufacturer. Even after
it became aware of a serious defect in one of its car's
bumpers, which could lead to death, it decided it was less
expensive to ignore the problem and be sued by a few
plaintiffs, rather than to fix the dangerous defect. 242 The
California Court of Appeals admonished the company and
allowed punitive damages, noting that "[g]overnmental
safety standards and the criminal law have failed to provide
adequate consumer protection against the manufacture and

238. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
also Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (Ct. App. 4th 1981)
("[Punitive damages] provide a motive for private individuals to enforce rules of
law and enable them to recoup the expenses of doing so which can be
considerable and not otherwise recoverable.").
239. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1993)
(citing Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc. 413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1991)).
240. Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1181 (1931).
241. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 58, at 1296.
242. See id. at 1313 ('The company balanced the cost of installing $11
rubber bladders in 11 million cars and 1.5 million light trucks against paying
for the actual damages attributable to 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn
injuries, and 2100 burned vehicles.").
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distribution of defective products. ' 243 Thus, punitive
damages have the effect of deterring even the most
powerful corporations and individuals from attempting to
circumvent justice by paying out meaningless amounts.
B. Punitive Damages as Victim Compensation
This Comment does not presuppose that every plaintiff
who collects punitive damages is harmed in proportion to
the award, or will put the money to good use. Rather, this
Comment values the empowerment and sense of vindication
that can come with punitive damages. 244 For example, in a
very high profile criminal case, Californian Scott Peterson
was convicted of murdering his wife Laci and their unborn
child. 245 Despite the fact that Scott Peterson was sentenced
to death, Laci's parents chose to sue their former son-in-law
in civil court. When asked what a civil suit could bring her,
Laci's mother Sharon Rocha replied, "satisfaction." 246 This
"satisfaction" is what curative damages attempt to capture.
They empower the victim and make substantive changes in
our society.
When people who have been wronged become plaintiffs,
they control the destiny of their case and if liability is
found, the defendant is held responsible to no one but
them. 247 This type of vindication has many positive results.
One commentator noted that "[s]triking back publicly
obliterates the insult, whether a person is the butt of an

243. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th
1981).
244. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 8 n.4 (1991) ('[A
punitive damage award] discourages private reprisals, restrains the strong,
influential, and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and encourages
recourse to and confident in the courts of law by those wronged or oppressed by
acts or practices not cognizable in or not sufficiently punished by the criminal
law."' (quoting Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 19-20 (Wis. 1914))).
245. People v. Peterson, No. SC055500A (San Mateo Super. Ct. Nov. 12,
2004).
246. Larry King Live: Encore Presentation:Interview with Sharon RochaPart 2 (CNN television broadcast Jan. 22, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR
1215709.
247. See CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETTING EVEN 1 (1999) ("[I]t is important for
victims to have the legal right to a substantial say in how their cases are
handled and resolved in the legal justice system.").
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office joke or a head of state whose embassy has been
bombed. Revenge erases that paralyzing moment of
revealed weakness. It enhances honor, shifts dignity back
into balance." 248 People who have been victimized deserve a
public forum to expose the wrongdoing and seek
249
vindication.
In our society, victims may speak of their desire to
exact vengeance against their wrongdoers in private circles,
however, in public, and within our system of justice, it is
considered improper to speak this way, 250 but vengeance
need not be bad. Indeed, "[v]engeance is the original
meaning of justice." 251 Yet the theory of just deserts, which
promotes the idea that a "person deserves punishment
proportionate to the moral wrong committed,"252 is publicly
condemned, but nevertheless cited by empirical evidence as
a major driving force behind both criminal and civil jury
verdicts. 253 As one legal scholar notes, "the sense of justice,

248. BLUMENFELD, supra note 14, at 26.

249. See Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the
Victim's Desire for Vengeance as a Justificationfor Punishment, 50 WAYNE L.
REV. 1115, 1119 (2004) ("[V]ictims deserve the right to be actively involved in
decisions regarding punishment, even if they are motivated by revenge, so long
as their involvement does not jeopardize the accuracy of the adjudication of
guilt, or the fairness of punishment. Such involvement may aid some victims to
heal emotionally .... ).
250. SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE 5 (1983) ("One measure of a civilization's
complexity is the distance between aggrieved individuals and the
administration of revenge."). Also of note, the word "vengeance" does not appear
in BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
251. Robert C. Solomon, Justice and the Passion for Vengeance, in WHAT IS
JUSTICE? 292 (Robert C. Solomon & Mark C. Murphy eds., 1990) ("The word
'justice' in the Old Testament and in Homer too virtually always refers to
revenge. Throughout . . . history, the concept of justice has been far more
concerned with the punishment of crimes and the balancing of wrongs than it

has been with the fair distribution of goods and services.").
252. Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We
Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 284 (2002).
253. Id. ("[DIespite strongly state preferences for deterrence theory,
individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively by just deserts
concern."); see also Robbennolt, supra note 56, at 133 ("[J]urors intuitively make
punitive damage awards that emphasize retribution.").
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properly understood, does have a place in the way we talkand argue-about matters of justice. ' 254
Society views the concept of revenge as a relic of the
past, much like the concept of Lex Talionis.255 There are
many reasons for this. The concept of just deserts "evokes a
deep unease in modern men and women. '256 Often our
modern society is "more comfortable with the notion of
forgiving and forgetting, however unrealistic it may be,
than with the private and public reality of revenge, with its
unsettling echoes of the primitive and its inescapable
reminder of the fragility of human order. '257 Despite
society's outward contempt for revenge, if administered
without bias within an appropriate structure, revenge can
lead to positive results. 258
"[T]he universal human feeling [is] that bad men ought
to suffer. It is no use turning up our noses at this feeling, as
if it were wholly base. '259 Instead, it is inherent that we

254. Markus Dirk Dubber, Making Sense of the Sense of Justice, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 815, 817 (2005) ("[Tjhe sense of justice is the glue that holds communities
of justice together in a modern world void of substantive commonalities.").
255. See Solomon, supra note 251, at 293 ("[T]he Old Testament instruction
that revenge should be limited to 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."'
(quoting Exodus 21:24-5)).
256. JACOBY, supra note 250, at 1.
257. Id. Jacoby also notes that:
Justice is a legitimate concept in the modern code of civilized
behavior. Vengeance is not. We prefer to avert our eyes from those who
persist in reminding us of wrongs they have suffered-the mother
whose child disappeared three years ago on a New York street and
who, instead of mourning in silence, continues to appear on television
and appeal for information about her missing son; the young Sicilian
who, instead of marrying her rapist as ancient local custom dictates,
scandalized the town by bringing criminal charges; the concentrationcamp survivors who, instead of putting the past behind them, persist in
pointing their fingers at ex-Nazis living comfortable lives on quiet
streets. Such people are disturbers of the peace; we wish they would
take their memories away to a church, a cemetery, a psychotherapist's
office and allow us to return justice and vengeance to the separate
compartments they supposedly occupy in twentieth-century life.
Id. at 1-2.
258. See id. at 115 ("Retribution per se is an integral component of just as
well as unjust legal systems.").
259. C. S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 81 (1961).
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recognize victims' needs and provide for those needs in a
controlled setting. Curative damages do not only provide for
the victim's needs. Curative damages take this concept one
step further by providing for society as well. Punitive
damages do not fix the problem that created the harm.
Curative damages do. Much like the goal of the criminal
justice system, they also improve the well-being of society.
C. Punitive Damages FurtherAssist Crime Victims
The distinctions between criminal and civil law have
blurred. 260 No longer is split recovery the only concept that
muddies the waters. In 1984, Congress passed the Federal
Victims of Crime Act ("VOCA"). 2 61 Among other things,
crime victims can seek reimbursement of crime-related
expenses. 262 For example, in New York State, federal and
state funding is pooled to create a reimbursement account
for victims of crimes. The state portion of the funding comes
directly from the offenders who, by way of mandatory
surcharges, pay into the Criminal Justice Improvement
Account ("CJIA"). In combination with funds collected
through VOCA provisions, the CJIA pays unreimbursed
crime-related expenses including replacement of personal
263
property, crime-scene clean-up, and funeral expenses.
These reparation payments mimic compensatory damages
in civil suits.
Additionally, in jurisdictions that allow victim impact
statements and restorative justice programs, victims have
more say in the cases against their perpetrators, but they
still lack the autonomy and empowerment that comes with
controlling their own case. In our criminal justice system,

260. Ellis, supra note 104, at 2 ("The concept of punitive damages lies in the
borderland that both bridges and separates criminal law and torts.").
261. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-08 (2006).
262. See Linda Trang, Comment, The Taxation of Crime Victim Restitution:
An Unjust Penalty on the Victim, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1319, 1335-36 (2002)
("Victim restitution laws allow prosecutors to seek court-ordered restitution to
directly compensate victims. The primary purpose of such a law is to have
criminals make restitution to the victim by restoring or indemnifying victims
for all losses suffered.").
263. See NEW YORK STATE CRIME VICTIM'S BOARD ANNUAL REPORT (2000-

2001), available at http://cvb.state.ny.us/forms/00-01%20Annual%2OReport%20
for%20Web.pdf.
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the state decides whether to bring criminal charges, what those
charges will be, whether to accept a plea bargain, whether to go to
trial, and what the strategy at trial will be, including whether the
victim will even testify against the accused .... Notably2 64
absent
from any prescribed role in these proceedings is the victim.

Because prosecutors, not the victim, control criminal
cases, decisions made by district attorneys' offices bind the
victims without their say, leaving victims without any legal
recourse, other than seeking tort remedies. 265 Additionally,
many acts of wrongdoing do not rise to the level of a
criminal offense, leaving victims without any recourse in
the criminal system. Curative damages are the perfect
avenue for victims that fall between the cracks and must
turn to civil litigation. Curative damages provide healing
and empowerment for plaintiffs who may not otherwise
obtain justice, while also providing justice for society.
V. CURATIVE DAMAGES

Curative damages smooth over a gaping hole in the
doctrine of punitive damages. While punitive damages may
provide vindication, curative damages go significantly
further to correct the problem that created the harm and
provide real healing for the victims. Part of the healing that
comes from curative damages is the ability for victims to
declare to the courts, and to the public, their charitable
intent for the money. 266 As Justice Pfiefer pointed out,
"[t]hose on the outside looking in often think grieving
survivors are trying to make a profit off a loved one's death.

264. Eisenstat, supra note 249, at 1153-54.
265. Id. at 1144. Of note, while some states bar civil recovery when criminal
recovery is available, most do not. See Exxon Valdez v. Hazelwood, 270 F.3d
1215, 1226 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A] prior criminal sanction does not generally, as a
matter of law, bar punitive damages."); Olmstead v. First Interstate Bank, 449
N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1989) (affirming that the jury's verdict of $100,000 in
punitive damages was not excessive despite the fact that the defendant was
sanctioned $500.00 during criminal proceedings); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 201
(2005) ("As a general rule, the fact that an act is punishable criminally does not
of itself authorize or prevent the recovery of exemplary damages in a civil
action.").
266. "In a world in which justice is getting ever more impersonal and
statistical, vengeance retains the virtue of being personal." Solomon, supra note
251, at 302.
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How many times have you heard it, or thought it yourself'the money won't bring them back."' 267 Sadly, in our civil
system, change cannot be mandated, only
dollars can be
268
used to compensate a loss or fix a wrong.
While curative damages were designed within the
context of a wrongful death suit, it is applicable to many
other types of tort actions. The doctrine of curative damages
could be used in actions ranging from product liability cases
to toxic torts. Curative damages have the potential to
ameliorate a range of societal harms and mitigate the
suffering of the plaintiff.
A. Telling JuriesAbout the Beneficiary of the Punitive
Award
One of the most controversial aspects of curative
damages is the ability to tell the jury where the money is
going to go. While it is possible for a plaintiff to donate their
punitive damages after trial, presenting this information to
the jury during the damages phase of the trial is critical for
several reasons. Allowing plaintiffs to inform the court and
jury of their intention for the award publicly dispels the
notion that they are seeking to profit off of a personal injury
or a loved one's death. Also, this information provides a
forum to raise awareness of the issue and may even recruit
people to support the resulting foundation. Additionally,
early studies show that immediately redirecting the
plaintiffs energy on the positive outcomes can lessen the
impact of the grieving process. 269 Lastly, informing the jury

267. Pfeifer, supra note 34.
268. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1450 (10th Cir.
1987) (holding that a court cannot reduce punitive damages in exchange for an
offer to fix the problem, noting "[t]he possibility that other potential defendants
would be able to reduce their liability for punitive damages in the same way
would encourage them to pursue the very behavior that the punitive award here
was intended to deter, and thus would discourage voluntary cessation of injurycausing conduct"); Morris, supra note 240, at 1189 ("The only limitations are
that the burden of the defendant's admonition must be confined to a money
judgment .... ). See generally KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?
(2005).
269. Dr. Camille Wortman is currently studying the effect of curative
damages on grieving families. Initial findings suggest evidence that when a
family is focused on preventing the harm from reoccurring, the grieving process
is dramatically lessened. Tom Murray Interview, supra note 11.
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of the award's intent at the damages phase provides them
with a more concrete framework for determining an
appropriate amount of damages. 270
Many critics fear that the jury will be unduly
prejudiced by learning where the money will go. 27 1 In a
lengthy dissent in a punitive damages case, Justice
O'Connor praised the jury system as a "guarantor of
fairness, a bulwark against tyranny, and a source of civic
values," 272 and from there launched into commentary
highlighting the fact that "jurors are not infallible
guardians of the public good. ' 273 She argued that "juries
may feel privileged to correct perceived social ills stemming
from unequal wealth distribution by transferring money
from 'wealthy' corporations to comparatively needier
plaintiffs. '274 While she noted that "retribution is a
permissible consideration in assessing punitive damages
awards," 275 she stopped short of acknowledging that
punitive damages are awarded against defendants who
have committed egregious wrongs. Curative damages, like
punitive damages, are not an arbitrary monetary
rebalancing tool.
In addition, many courts have weighed in on this issue
in the forum of split recovery.27 6 In 1990, the Oregon

270. Often one of the most controversial aspects of punitive damages is the
lack of concrete award guidelines for juries. According to the standard
enumerated in BMW, excessiveness of a verdict can be determined by the
proportion of the award to the "degree of reprehensibility; . . .the disparity
between the harm or potential harm suffered . ..and [the] punitive damages
award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties
authorized." BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996); see also
Lanzano v. City of New York, 519 N.E.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. 1988) (noting that
juries should be informed when awards are tax-exempt and instructed not to
consider tax consequences when formulating their awards).
271. See McDonough, supra note 3, at 25.
272. TXO Prod. Corp., v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 474.
274. Id. at 491.
275. Id. at 483.
276. See, e.g., Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 476 S.E.2d 565, 570 (Ga.
1996) ("By instructing the jury on the statutory scheme for allocating a punitive
damages award, the trial court improperly shifted the jury's focus from the
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Supreme Court heard the case of the Honeywell family, who
put a dining room set on a layaway plan in 1979.277 Due to
illness and unemployment, it took the Honeywells eight
278
years to pay off the debt and obtain the furniture.
Unbeknownst to the Honeywells, the dining room set they
had been scrimping and saving for had been knowingly sold
out from under them years before. 279 The jury awarded the
Honeywells $1,795 in compensatory damages and $20,000
in punitive damages. 28 0 However, the defendant appealed
the case because the trial judge informed the jury that if
they awarded punitive damages,
Oregon law requires that they be distributed as follows: First, the
attorney for the prevailing party shall be paid the amount agreed
upon between the attorney and the prevailing party; secondly, onehalf of the remainder shall be paid to the prevailing party; third,
the other half of the remainder shall be paid to the Criminal
Injury Compensation Account .... 281

The Supreme Court of Oregon found that this
instruction constituted a reversible error. It reasoned that
this instruction distracted the jury from the "appropriate
line of analysis," 28 2 which involved the defendant's conduct,
not the distribution of the award. The court voiced a belief
that the most serious problem that occurred due to these
instructions was that they "encouraged the jury to award
punitive damages for [the wrong] purpose." 28 3 Thus the
court reversed the award and remanded the
case to the
28 4
circuit court for a new punitive damages trial.

critical question of the defendant's conduct to the inappropriate question of the

plaintiffs compensation.").
277. Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Or. 1990).
278. See id.
279. See id. "Instead of the furniture ordered by plaintiffs, defendant
substituted a used or shopworn table and much cheaper and lower quality
chairs." Id.
280. Id. at 1021.
281. Id. at 1020.
282. Id. at 1021.
283. Id. at 1022.
284. Id. at 1023.
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Three years later, in Burke v. Deere,28 5 Clair Burke was
awarded $650,000 in compensatory damages and $50
million in punitive damages after he severely injured his
hand in a farm accident with a Deere combine. 28 6 Both
awards were reduced by an order of remittitur to $390,000
and $28 million respectively. 28 7 Deere appealed on several
grounds. 288 Despite determining that there was "no
evidence of any conduct so egregious as to support an award
of punitive damages," 289 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the fact that the trial court used a verdict
form that informed the jury that a portion of the punitive
award would go into a trust fund. 290 In this case, the trust
fund is actually Iowa's "Civil Reparations Trust."291
Additionally, the plaintiff's attorney falsely intimated that
part of the award would compensate victims of similar farm
accidents. 292 This comment appeared more prejudicial in
light of the jury's exposure to the testimony of victims of
other devastating farm accidents. 293 Thus, the court
determined that "the use of evidence of other post-control
accidents served to enhance the award of punitive
damages," which constituted reversible error. 294
The Burke holding can be easily distinguished from the
concept of curative damages. Burke's attorney misled the
jury as to the purpose of the trust fund, intimating that the
fund would serve people such as those the jury saw who
were seriously and permanently damaged in farm
accidents. 295

285. 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993).
286. See id. at 501.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 511.
290. See id. at 506.
291. See IOWA CODE § 668A.1(2)(b) (2006).
292. See Burke, 6 F.3d at 507. "In closing argument, counsel for Burke
argued that seventy-five percent of the punitive damages award 'will go into a
civil trust fund to help prevent this sort of thing in a different way."' Id. at 513.
293. See id. at 505 n.9.
294. See id. at 506.
295. See id.

2007]

CURATIVE DAMAGES

1635

The dissent offered hope that there may be occasions to
inform the jury where the punitive damages would go when
Justice Heaney mentioned, "[a]lthough I do not find the
present case an appropriate opportunity to resolve the
question whether Iowa juries should ever be informed of the
destinations of such funds, I do think the erroneous
information provided in the present case, along with the
'296
argument of counsel, proved prejudicial.
Indeed, many judges have stated the belief that juries
should be informed of the destination of the punitive
damages award. As Justice Shaw of the Supreme Court of
Florida stated, "[t]he statutory mandate to keep secret from
the jury the State's sixty-percent take of the punitive
damages award prevents the jury from performing its
proper function. ' 297 Even the Supreme Court of the United
States has noted that punitive damages determinations
have "been always left to the discretion of the jury, as the
degree of punishment to be thus inflicted must depend on
the peculiar circumstances of each case. ' 29 8 Yet, most splitrecovery statutes carry the caveat that the jury must be
kept in the dark about the split. 299
To pretend that the jury does not consider where the
money goes is a myth. 300 Empirical evidence exists to show
that "juries award the same aggregate amount to plaintiffs

296. Id. at 514 n.1 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
297. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 804 (Fla. 1992) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
298. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 16 (1991) (citing Day v.
Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1852)) (emphasis added).
299. See, e.g., CAL. CIrV. CODE § 3294.5(g) (West 2006) (repealed July 1, 2006)
("A jury shall not be informed that any portion of a punitive damages award
will be paid to a government fund .... However, nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect a punitive damages award if a juror or jurors had
independent knowledge that a portion of a punitive damages award will be paid
to a government fund."); The Roundtable responds to H.B. 1741's Changes in
Punitive Awards, supra note 206, at 1 ('The new law also states that the jury
will not be informed of the division of punitive damages. Authors of the measure
say that this will prevent any undue influence in the jury's deliberations about
punitive damages.").
300. See, e.g., Fattah, supra note 208, at A14 (plaintiffs attorney, Robert S.
"Campbell pointed out that when the jury handed down their judgments in
2001, they were taking his clients into account, not the state, in what was
justice").
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whether or not they seek punitive damages." 30 1 Even courts
have supported the notion that those harmed more severely
deserve more consideration. For example, in Tennessee,
Gene M. Nixon was found liable for punitive damages in the
amount of $100,000 to a corporate tenant and $450,000 to
Florence Gordon, who lost her home adjacent to the
building after Nixon commissioned the arson of the
corporate building. 30 2 In upholding the differential punitive
sums, the court reasoned that "[t]he defendant's act was
more egregious toward Mrs. Gordon than toward the other
plaintiffs. Mrs. Gordon lost all of her personal belongings
and was lucky to escape death, a fact of which the
defendant was aware. The tenant was a corporation and
lost only inventory and supplies."3 03 If the true aim of
punitive damages is deterrence and punishment, the jury
should have awarded identical sums to both plaintiffs. After
all, Nixon's act of arson was exactly the same. Why would
the court measure the actual harm done to the individual
plaintiffs, rather than punish the defendant's egregious
conduct?
While the law needs to limit bias and passion, 304 basic
human decency need not be removed from the equation.
Recently, in Ohio, Natalie Barnes, a twenty-four-year-old
disabled woman, died when her life-sustaining catheter
slipped out of her chest during a routine dialysis treatment.
The health aide hired to vigilantly watch Natalie left her
unattended. After Natalie's death, her mother Andrea
Barnes sank into a "depression so deep she requires
assisted-living care. ' 30 5 A jury found in Barnes' favor and
awarded $3.1 million in compensatory damages and $3
million in punitive damages.306 When interviewed after the
301. Welles, supra note 221, at 212. For information about how juries
formulate punitive damage awards, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002).

302. See Coppinger Color Lab, Inc. v. Nixon, 698 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn. 1985).
303. Id. at 75.
304. See generally Kristen Hays, Enron Jury Pool Told Not to Seek
2006, available at http://www.
Jan. 30,
Vengeance, ABC NEWS,
abcnews.go.com/Business/ print?id=1557283 ("[The Judge] told the pool that the
jury box was no place for anyone seeking vengeance.").
305. James F. McCarty, Jury Hands 6.1 Million to Family of Victim; Home
Health-CareFirm Must Pay Damage Award, PLAIN DEALER, May 5, 2005, at B1.
306. Id.
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trial, the jurors noted that the fate of Andrea Barnes was a
large concern. "'Everybody wanted to know how the money
would be used' said a woman juror from Cleveland. 'We
wanted to make sure Andrea Barnes is going to be 30taken
7
care of for her pain and suffering because she is sick."'
As the Ohio Court of Common Pleas recognized in the
Moore case, it is possible to inform the jury of the
destination of the funds without bias toward the
defendant. 308 Bifurcating the trial into a liability phase and
a damages phase, a common trial procedure that many
states already use, can help to eliminate bias. 30 9 It is not
until the damages phase, and after the jury determines the
defendant is liable, that that the jury will be informed
where the punitive damages money is to go. Once this is
done, the plaintiff will have to sign a binding stipulation
filed with the trial judge to ensure that the money will
indeed go to the charitable endeavor presented to the jury.
B. Monitoring Curative Funds
Another concern presented by curative damages is that
plaintiffs may falsely claim that funds will be used for a
beneficial cause. As one critic stated, "[i]t is severely
prejudicial to defendants to have the avowed unbinding
potential use of punitive damages before a jury. '310 This
concern can be addressed by requiring the use of binding
stipulations. 311 Once the plaintiff has stipulated that the
award will be given toward a charitable cause or new
foundation to ameliorate the harm, the money must be
turned over. Therefore, after the liability portion of the
trial, but prior to entering the damages phase, the plaintiff

307. Id. (quoting a juror).
308. "Conrail makes no showing that knowledge of a charitable use of
punitive damages destroyed the impartial character of the jury. Simply said,
the jury was told that the plaintiffs intended to use the punitive damage award
for a charitable purpose. Such use created no prejudicial self-interest in the
award." Order at 13, Moore v. Consol. Rail Corp., 1995-CV-01196 (Stark County
Ct. of Com. P1. filed July 18, 1995).
309. See sources cited supranote 12.
310. McDonough, supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis added).
311. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY
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would execute this binding stipulation. Then, and only
then, the jury could be informed of the plaintiffs intentions.
Curative damages are also self-selecting. There will be
plaintiffs who are not interested in carrying the torch of a
particular cause. If a plaintiff is not ready to address the
problem, they will not pursue curative damages. A plaintiff
must be willing to see the curative damages award to
fruition, whether they are creating their own new charity
like the Moores and Mrs. Wightman, or giving their money
to existing causes as Mr. Dardinger did with the punitive
damages that were awarded to him.
CONCLUSION

Curative damages seek to restore plaintiffs and society
in a controlled and responsible way. They redistribute
resources to those who have suffered losses that cannot be
remunerated by a quantitative sum. More so, they punish
the defendant in a public way and, unlike split-recovery
statutes, allow for plaintiff autonomy.
Given the correct scenario whereby a plaintiff is either
the victim or family member of a victim of a serious harm,
curative damages can make an enormously positive impact
on the victim and society alike. Provided that the jury is
carefully instructed, bias is eliminated and replaced with a
passion to provide real justice.
Vicky and Denny Moore have proved that good can
come from even the most atrocious situation. Their
foundation is making a tangible difference each and every
day by eliminating the "bad crossings [that] kill good
drivers," 312 all while doing something just as important for
themselves-healing. Vicky Moore's wish is to make sure
that Ryan's death was not in vain: "[w]e're hoping that he
knows what we're doing and that he's proud. '313

312. Angels On Track, http://www.angelsontrack.org (last visited Mar. 22,
2007).
313. McCarty, supra note 1, at Al.

